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Abstract 
Against the backdrop of socio-economic conflict, this paper analyses a number of approaches to classes in the 
economics, political economy and sociology literatures. Our argument is structured into two themes which 
consider: (i) class and individualism; (ii) social and economic classes. We also consider deductive and inductive 
class analyses within these themes. This typology is used to classify the methodological approaches of scholars 
from a variety of traditions, thereby providing a basis for assessing their congruence, and the plausibility of 
developing an integrated perspective on class, spanning heterodox economics and sociology. Initial discussion 
considers classical political economy and its Marxian derivatives, including Lenin’s criteria for categorising 
classes, and relatively recent approaches derived from economics, political economy (in the Marxian tradition), 
and sociology. Based on our analysis of the two themes identified we argue that the abstract pairs of categories 
— class-individual, social-economic — should not be falsely dichotomised. In addition, we argue that a 
reductionist approach to class (be it economic or micro-reductionism) only provides a partial account, and fails to 
capture the complexity of class in relation to other forms of social stratification. 
 
  
                                                          
1Corresponding author. Address for correspondence Birmingham City Business School, The Curzon Building, 4 
Cardigan Street, Birmingham, B4 7BD, United Kingdom. Email: eleni.papgiannaki@bcu.ac.uk; 
bruce.philp@bcu.ac.uk; alexandra.arntsen@ntu.ac.uk. The authors would like to thank Jamie Morgan, Bruce 
Cronin and participants at the Association for Heterodox Conference (2018, De Montfort University) for 
comments on an earlier draft. Two referees also provided insightful comments that brought sharper focus to the 
paper. All remaining errors are our own. 
2 | P a g e  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Class is an important element in the make-up of contemporary societies. It is also complex. At 
the most basic level the capitalist and working class have opposing interests in the distribution 
of income. However, within and between nation-states, shared interests can cut across class 
divides. In recent years, this has been manifest in the US with Donald Trump’s presidency, 
where with significant working class support he has succeeded in pushing a narrative whereby 
Mexican and Chinese workers are the enemies of US workers, with evidence pointing to a role 
for racism and sexism in his election victory (Schaffner, Macwilliams and Nteta, 2018). In the 
UK, Brexit was another manifestation of working class division, and evidence points to left-
behind communities voting as a reaction against migrant workers (Hearne, Semmens-Wheeler 
and Hill, 2019). A similar pattern is repeated in a series of EU countries like Italy and France, 
with the far-right garnering increased working class support. In the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis (from 2007-8), in which governments propped-up finance though bailing out 
banks, austerity was imposed on workers, in extremis in Greece. However, the contemporary 
political debate seems to view class as secondary, as other axes of social stratification gain 
greater prominence (examples including #MeToo, and the Black Lives Matter movement). 
Although the main contribution of our paper is methodological and theoretical, the apparent 
neglect of class as driver of contemporary inequality suggests the need to revisit classes, and 
their formulation.  
 
In this paper, we explore class, stressing the dichotomies and forms of reductionism in 
scholarly debates in the economics, political economy and sociology literature. These issues 
are fundamental concerns for these approaches; however, the configuration of academic 
disciplines complicates their study. By the end of the nineteenth century, economics and 
sociology had emerged out of political economy, and as we demonstrate this created a 
challenge as the explanatory role of classes was purged from mainstream treatments, as the 
political and methodological individualism of neoclassical theory began to predominate. For 
these reasons, an examination of the relationship between economics and sociology, in relation 
to class, is both conceptually and contemporaneously apposite. Although some researchers 
have argued that there is a trend toward economic sociology or socio-economics (Zafirovski, 
2016), we would argue that contemporary class analysis has not been a focal point of 
discussion, and continues to be largely ignored in the mainstream economics literature.  
 
3 | P a g e  
 
 
In this context, our paper explores two themes — (i) class and individualism; and, (ii) social 
and economic treatments of class — in relation to leading thinkers from the history of 
economics and sociological thought. In so doing we draw upon the notions of reductionism in 
the context of marginalism, as identified by Fine and Milonakis (2009).2 We structure the paper 
based on the pairs of abstract categories that are identified as dominant on this issue, presenting 
the literature that focuses on these categories (See Table 1). In the next section, we consider 
the debate over the relationship between the individual and class, and definitions of class which 
define it, respectively, on a micro or a macro basis. In the third section, we discuss the 
relationship between sociological and economic configurations, their false dichotomy, and 
disciplinary reductionism. A recurring theme is deductive and inductive approaches towards 
class analysis. In the final section, we summarise and indicate a way ahead for heterodox 
economics, which draws upon an interdisciplinary, anti-reducionist, perspective.  
 
2. Individual versus Class: Micro or Macro approach towards class?   
Reductionism is usually presented as a position in the philosophy of science concerning the 
relationship between adjacent areas of scientific interest (Little, 1991, pp.190-1; Philp, 1996, 
p.241). Frequently, reductionist claims are stated in the form that something “just is” something 
else. Microreduction is the claim that a certain object can be explained as the sum of the parts. 
Thus, Oppenheim and Putnam (1991 [1955]) suggest social groups should be explained by the 
interactions of the individuals which comprise those groups. 
                                                          
2 Fine and Milonakis (2009) identify a ‘triple reductionism’ in mainstream economics. The first 
two — explanations are reduced to the level of the human individual, and the economy is 
treated as being governed solely by supply and demand  — are discussed in detail here. The 
third element of their criticism challenges definitions of class that attempt to attribute a 
universality among the different stages of history, arguing that they are problematic. 
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Table 1: Abstract Categories, False Dichotomies, Reductionism 
Abstract categories 
 
False Dichotomies Reductionism Framework proposed 
Class-individual: 
Microfoundations 
Classless individuals vs. classes as 
units of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
(1A) 
Classes are simple aggregations of 
individuals and their relationships. 
 
 
 
 
(1B) 
Different “levels” of analysis are 
plausible in social science, and the 
analysis of interactions between levels 
should be integral to class analyses. 
 
Factors in addition to class influence 
behaviour.  
Social-economic Social vs. economic definitions of 
class. 
 
 
 
 
(2A) 
Social class is a form, or manifestation 
of, underlying economic forces. 
 
 
 
 
(2B) 
Social and cultural factors cannot be 
analysed independently of the economic. 
 
Although we may define a group 
economically, social and cultural forces 
create linkages that render class 
interactions irreducible. 
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Mainstream economics, in common with Austrian economics, broadly adopts a methodological 
individualist approach to explanation, which is a microreductionist approach (1B in Table 1). 
In contrast, according to Fine and Milonakis (2009), classical political economy treats ‘the 
economic system as a whole … [as] the object of investigation, while classes form the basic 
unit of analysis’ (p.13). However, it is also possible to observe elements in Adam Smith’s work 
that go beneath this macro-level, and Urquhart detects one of Smith’s main dualisms, between 
‘individualistic self-interest’, which can be contrasted with the ‘collectivist structuralist 
distribution of wealth in aggregate terms’ (1993, pp.190-1). These two aspects of Smith’s work 
spawned different traditions, with Ricardo and Marx following a macro-view, while the 
marginalists, neoclassicals and Austrians adopted an individualist approach. 
 
In the early nineteenth century, Ricardo began to develop one part of Smith’s theory of 
distribution, innovating with regard to the theories of value, rent, machinery and trade. Ricardo 
developed Smith’s class-based theory, arguing that output ‘is divided among three classes of 
the community; namely, the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock of capital necessary 
for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is cultivated’ (Ricardo 1951 [1821], 
p.5). As with Smith, Ricardo maintained that in the progress of society, the distribution by class 
changed, but he also incorporated diminishing returns in agriculture into his theory. Fine and 
Milonakis (2009) argue that ‘Ricardo’s analysis is … devoid of Smith’s dualism’, with Ricardo 
being committed to a holistic treatment of class (p.21).  By bringing together three traditions 
— German philosophy (dialectics), French socialism, and British political economy — Marx’s 
socio-historical analysis treats classes in similar fashion. Indeed, it is classes rather than 
individuals that are the basic units of analysis in Marx’s system, with class conflict as the 
catalyst of change (see 1A in Table 1).  
 
Marx and Engels (1967 [1848]) also truncated the three-class structure of classical political 
economy into two: the capitalist class (the bourgeoisie) and the working class (the proletariat). 
Each was defined in terms of their relationship to the means of production. This was developed 
within a surplus-value model, where Marx (1976 [1867]) argued that the exploitation of 
workers is a necessary feature of capitalism. This entails classes are not merely “groups” of 
people, as they are categorised by their relationship to the means of production which, itself, 
generates conflict. In particular, conflict over wages, the length of the working day and 
technological change has profound distributive consequences. As Marx notes:  ‘individuals are 
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dealt with here only in so far as they are personifications of economic categories, the bearers 
of particular class relations and interests’ (1976 [1867], p.92). 
 
In the twentieth century, Lenin (1919) further developed the Marxian approach to class. This 
was at a time when Marxists were wrestling with the practicalities of implementing socialism 
in the post-revolutionary Soviet Union. Within this framework ‘large groups of people’ (p.15) 
were categorised as “classes” according to: (i) their status in a historically-determined system 
of production; (ii) the proportion of the means of production they possess; (iii) their role in the 
social organisation of labour; (iv) the type and quantity of socially produced wealth they could 
access. Although we are presently focussing on the “level” of analysis in relation to 
microreductionism (cell 1B and 1C in Table 1), by focussing on ‘large groups’ of people, Lenin 
obviates the need to explore small and peculiar groups, which may be anachronisms from 
previous modes or production. He also prepares the ground for a historical conception of class, 
in contrast to the ahistorical individual.  
 
Classical and Marxian political economy shared a focus on class-based distribution of income 
as a determinant, and consequence, of societal progress. In contrast, as neoclassical economics 
began to develop — initially through Jevons (1970 [1871]), Menger (1976 [1871]) and Walras 
(2013 [1874]), and later through Wicksteed (1894) and Clark (1908) — the focus began to 
switch toward individual agents and “natural laws” which governed their remuneration. 
Departing completely from the political economy tradition, and following Smith’s principle of 
self-interest, marginalists focussed their analysis on individual agents. For Menger, only 
individuals have interests (1985 [1883], p.93). No collective body, such as the national 
economy, can be analysed in its own right, without reference to its individual constituent 
members (reductionist fallacy 1B). According to Zouboulakis (2002): ‘In marginalist hands, 
and later on with neoclassical writers, methodological individualism takes the specific form of 
what has been called ‘psychological individualism’, in which the individual is simply 
considered as a rational agent driven by some psychological (utilitarian) motive, to maximise 
their own benefit’ (p.30). Methodological individualism was thus combined with the calculus 
of optimisation (for discussion of this see Fine and Milionakis, 2009, pp.91-118). 
 
An early example of marginal productivity theory was outlined in Wicksteed (1894). He argued 
that an entrepreneur contemplating hiring or firing a workman would evaluate whether the 
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individual was “worth” his wage, ‘i.e. whether he will increase the product, other factors 
remaining constant, at least to the extent of his wage; and he will take on more men as long as 
the last one earns at least as much as his wage, but no longer’ (p.9). Clark (1908) was also 
interested in the “laws” by which the income of society was divided between wages, interest 
and profits. He challenged the view that the existence of profit was founded upon the 
exploitation of labour, and appealed to a property principle — ‘to each what he creates’ (1908, 
p.9). As he argues further on: ‘The product of any productive agent is, in fact, just what it can 
add to the marginal product of capital and labor’ (p.346).  
 
Schumpeter also considered issues of microreduction. Although he argued that ‘there is no 
choice but to start with the individual’, he clarifies that: ‘In some problems of sociology or 
political life … we have no choice but to start from the social whole’ (1931, p.287). In 
particular, he claimed that: ‘We know that every individual is fashioned by the social influences 
in which he grows up. In this sense he is the produce of the social entity or class and therefore 
not a free agent’ (p.286). Elsewhere, Veblen did not prejudge the superiority of individualistic 
formulations and conducted his analysis at different “levels”. For example, Veblen (1990 
[1914]) adopts an individualistic and psychological treatment, departing from the rationality 
and optimising behaviour that marginalists assumed, instead offering an analysis of instinct 
and habit psychology. In contrast, Veblen (1994 [1899] develops a collectivist analysis, where 
classes become the basic unit, and different types of institutions and instincts (e.g. the leisure 
class, business enterprise) define human behaviour. This leads Hodgson to conclude that 
‘Veblen has avoided reductionism in either direction’, adding that ‘individuals and social 
structure are mutually constitutive’ (2004, p. 179). 
 
Parallel to the developments in economics and political economy, sociology was posing 
questions regarding class. Weber (2002 [1905]) was particularly important in this regard. 
Contra Marx’s historical materialism, Weber emphasises the sphere of culture. More 
specifically, his analysis of Protestantism and its relationship to capitalism was his most 
significant contribution. For Weber, class and social status are two dimensions of the social 
structure. Weber’s class analysis incorporates a specific causal component of actors’ life 
chances, which are based on economic interests and wealth, and represented within labour and 
commodity markets. Possessing material resources, acquired by advantage in the market, 
generates different living standards. Of interest to us is the role of the “actor” in Weber’s 
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analysis, in relation to power, domination and social action. In this context, “power” is 
identified as the ability of an actor to command resources, “domination” is the exercise of 
authority by actors, and “societal action” requires actors to believe that they belong together 
with others, sharing a belief of affiliation. Of relevance here is the actor appears to be an 
individualist formulation (1B), albeit it the shared belief of affiliation is external to the actor. 
 
In contrast, Durkheim (2013 [1893]) suggested that sociology should study phenomena 
attributed to society at large, rather than focussing on individual actors. In particular, he was 
interested in social facts: ‘A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of 
exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is 
general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent 
of its individual manifestations’ (Durkheim, 1964 [1895], p.13). In addition, social facts are 
attributed to other social facts, instead of individual behaviours or individual consciousness. 
This approach is diametrically opposed to the individualist formulations of neoclassical 
economists and Weber, but Durkheim’s overwhelming focus on the social relegates individual 
agency to a secondary concern, contra our recommendation (1C). As noted by Allan (2005): 
‘Even the most “individualistic” or “subjective” phenomena, such as love, freedom or suicide, 
would be regarded by Durkheim as objective social facts’ (p.108). His structural functionalism 
approach allows little space for causal “feedback” from the individual and, although 
Durkheim’s work consists of a strong polemic against methodological individualism, it is 
restricted in its one-way causal approach to interaction from society to the individual.  
 
Among the more recent sociological approaches, Bourdieu’s (1984) has attracted a great deal 
of attention. In his framework an individual’s position in social space is connected to practices 
via the notion of class habitus. Habitus frames each individual’s position in social space, 
manifest as clusters of preferences and practices. Culturally, consumption proclivities emerge 
which are associated with different social classes. Habitus thus offers a sociological theory that 
accounts for preference formation in an interdisciplinary way, which is a subject largely 
ignored by mainstream economists. A further element of Bourdieu’s theory is that of field, or 
‘field of social classes’ (Bourdieu 1984, p.345; Weininger 1984, p.128). This metaphor likens 
the social setting to a sports field or battlefield, where individuals compete from a position of 
advantage or disadvantage. As Fine (2000) notes, although Bourdieu seems to analyse at both 
a micro and macro level, his methodological individualism is manifest when he compares 
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individual endowments of economic and cultural capital. Likewise, as noted by Crompton 
(2010), sociology has witnessed ‘a sidelining of the significance of material structures … and 
a growing emphasis on cultural explanations as well as an embrace of individualist 
interpretations (p.11; see also Savage, 2000). 
 
Wright is another prominent sociologist whose work gained recognition in the later part of the 
twentieth and early part of the twenty-first centuries (1985, 1994, 2005). Working within the 
analytical Marxist tradition, Wright’s (1985) primary concern was what constitutes a class? In 
exploring this, he notes of Marx, that much of his work is concerned with “abstract structural 
maps of class relations, and the analysis of concrete conjunctural maps of classes-as-actors” 
(1985, p.6). A hallmark of analytical Marxism was its search for microfoundations, although 
Wright did not embrace the methodological individualism adopted by others in this school 
(Elster, 1985; Roemer, 1981, 1982, 1994), instead endorsing a particular form of anti-
reductionism. Wright et al (1992) maintained that relationships between human individuals 
were explanatory, but not all macro-social entities could be reduced. In later work, Wright 
(2005) sought to clarify this further, distinguishing between macro- and micro-levels of 
analysis. The former sought to analyse at an aggregate level, for example examining how high 
degrees of concentration in a particular industry might impact the potential for trade union 
organisation. In contrast a micro-analysis of class seeks to ‘understand the ways in which class 
impacts on individuals’ (p.13). This bears some similarity to Veblen, since instinct and “habit 
psychology” could be thought of as manifestations of the effect of class on the individual. 
Moreover, it represents an alternative view from that within mainstream microeconomics, 
which takes preferences as given and individual behaviours as generators of aggregate 
outcomes. In this sense, Wright does not dichotomise class and the individual. 
 
Overall, the neoclassical approach to factor incomes, based on marginal productivity theory, 
provides an unsatisfactory basis for explaining contemporary patterns of income distribution 
and inequality. As noted by Crompton, it is necessary ‘to retain a focus on institutions and 
structures — including the structure of the employed labour force — that contribute to the 
persistence of class inequality’ (2010, p.20). Thus, a methodological individualistic 
formulation fails to capture more complex social forces and, although less narrow, formulations 
such as those of Weber and Bourdieu, might also be criticised on the basis of their 
individualism. Ricardo, Marx and Durkheim may also be seen problematic, as they focussed 
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on classes, without paying attention to the explanatory role of human individuals. We would 
maintain that different levels of analysis are plausible in social science, and the analysis of 
interactions between levels should be integral to class analysis (see Table 1). 
 
3. Social or Economic Classes   
A second sense in which the term “reductionism” is used pertains to disciplinary frameowrks 
and concepts. By way of example, Fine and Milanokis (2009, p.109) criticise mainstream 
economics for a reductionist fallacy whereby the economy is treated as being governed solely 
by supply and demand, with non-economic or social factors excluded. In this vein, the 
importance of defining class as a socioeconomic category, and not reducing it to a particular 
disciplinary focus or aspect, is explored in this section.  
 
Smith’s theory of distribution was constructed historically from a primitive society (“the rude 
state”), which precedes the accumulation of stock and appropriation of land, to a capitalist 
society, where three classes served as the basis for classical political economy (landlords, 
masters and workmen). Smith was also aware of the political sphere, analysing the state of 
development and its effect on class-based distribution in different countries. It is noteworthy, 
as argued by Philp and Trigg (2016), that Smith highlighted the political and legal context that 
served the interests of masters, against the worker. But, his principal focus was on classes, 
defined by category of income.  
 
This focus on income categories was also manifest in Ricardo’s work, where he identified a 
clear conflict of interest (1951 [1821]). Marx’s work is distinctive from Smith and Ricardo in 
that he grounds the conflict between classes in the production process itself (rather than in the 
sphere of distribution). The socio-political aspect of class are manifest in much of Marx’s work. 
For example, Marx (1955 [1847]) distinguishes between a “class in itself”, which is a class that 
is not yet conscious of itself, and a “class for itself”, a class already conscious of its social role. 
More specifically, he states: ‘Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people 
of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common 
situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for 
itself. In the struggle … this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. 
The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a 
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political struggle’ (1955 [1847] p.79). Therefore, class struggle is not a mere economic activity 
focusing only on economic interests, but a political struggle too. 
 
Marx and Engels situated their analyses of human societies in the context of modes of 
production (primitive, slavery, feudalism, capitalism) with an associated socio-political 
superstructure (including culture, institutions, political structures and the state). In this sense, 
class is not defined solely in terms of distribution but, primarily, in relation to how an individual 
participates in the sphere of production. The former would constitute an economic definition 
of class. However, acknowledging the latter, it is clear that there is political and social 
dimension to class too (framed as it is by the superstructure). Foretelling the account of 
primitive accumulation in Marx (1976 [1867], pp.873-940), Marx and Engels observe:  ‘[The 
bourgeoisie] … has agglomerated population, centralised the means of production, and has 
concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political 
centralisation’ (1967 [1848], p.85). Thus, while the superstructure does not create classes as 
such, it reinforces production relations and class hierarchies. Thus, economic, social and 
political dimensions of class are inseparable, and we would reject the false dichotomy in 2A 
 
In contemporary society, there are other axes of stratification, as noted by Fine and Milonakis 
(2009): ‘Once again, greater complexity induces a rejection or refinement of Marx’s theory of 
class for a range of criteria deployed in finer or alternative forms of stratification. This is so, 
even before considering the social reproduction of the capital–labour relation where political, 
ideological and other socio-economic relations become involved (as in gender, race, 
nationality, etc.)’ (p.67). Engels (1972 [1884]), too, paid attention to within-class differences, 
such as gender inequality, which emerges in class societies. For instance, in the “primitive” 
mode of production, Engels suggests that there is neither class nor gender exploitation, but only 
natural differences. With the beginning of ownership in slave-societies, the exploitation of 
slaves by slave-owners occurs. And, this “ownership” creates the conditions for inheritance 
rights along patriarchal lines. According to Engels (1972 [1884]), the ‘world historical defeat 
of the female sex’ (p.120) is ushered in, as labour loses its social character and “women’s work” 
in the social sphere is now transformed into women’s work in the private household. Of course, 
under capitalism, women in bourgeois households enjoy considerably greater privileges than 
women in proletarian households, but the advent of a surplus within a class-based society, 
according to Engels, created the conditions for the subjugation of women.  
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In the first volume of Capital Marx (1976 [1867]) also describes how gender is located in this 
socioeconomic treatment. As mechanisation reduces the amount of physical power required in 
the production process, this facilitated greater participation of women and children in the 
factory. More specifically, Marx mentions that women and children’s labour exploitation is the 
last advancement of mechanisation: ‘In so far as machinery dispenses with muscular power, it 
becomes a means of employing labourers of slight muscular strength, and those whose bodily 
development is incomplete, but whose limbs are all the more supple. The labour of women and 
children was, therefore, the first thing sought for by capitalists who used machinery’ (p.517). 
This implies an increased household supply of labour. Within Marxian analysis, capitalism 
socialises production, since large groups work in the factory. As this socialisation takes place, 
women also “return” to social production, partially removing them from household activity. 
This had implications, as noted by Humphries (1990), in the context of the loss of the commons; 
this proletarianization process was associated with the slow elimination of access to resources 
other than wages, ultimately damaging the wellbeing of the household. Increased female 
participation also increases class-exploitation, and depresses wages through increasing the 
supply of labour. Marx (1976 [1867]) argues: ‘Machinery, by throwing every member of that 
family onto the labour market, spreads the value of the man’s labour-power over his whole 
family. It thus depreciates it’ (p.518). In summary, the perspectives of Marx and Engels see 
class formation and development as a historical process. They also show that the instruments 
of labour employed in the production process, particularly machinery, shapes class-based 
distribution of income, with ramifications for the household, comprising men, women and 
children. In other words the social nature of production drives distribution, implying 2B is an 
absurd abstraction. 
 
Since the emergence of marginalism, mainstream economics has focussed on the individual 
instead of class. Concurrently, abstract economic behaviour was analysed based on the 
assumption of rational agents. The economy was reduced to market transactions and this 
created an impediment to interdisciplinarity with disciplines that emphasise “social” forces. In 
recent years, a number of mainstream economists have sought to use the mainstream method 
to investigate the concerns of other social sciences. This approach has come to be known as 
“economics imperialism”, and its advocates have made bold claims. For example, Lazear has 
argued that ‘[mainstream] economics is the premier social science’ (2000, p.99). Definitions 
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of economics imperialism in contemporary economics refers to economic analysis of 
seemingly non-economic aspects of life — such as crime, law, the family, prejudice, tastes, 
irrational behaviour, politics, sociology, culture, religion, war, science and research — using 
economics principles and methods. This is, explicitly, a form of economics reductionism, 
where societal outcomes are reduced to economic causes, and positive economics strips out 
any kind of social awareness (reductionism of form 2B).  
 
There are also manifestations of this in heterodox economics. Sraffa’s (1960) system has 
similar principles to Ricardo’s in identifying a trade-off between wages and profits. His initial 
model considered subsistence production before introducing a surplus in which national 
income was distributed in the form of wages and profits. In line with classical political 
economy, he assumed equalisation of the profit rate and used the analytical tool of the standard 
commodity to frame his theory of distribution, deriving a negatively-sloped wage-profit 
frontier (pp.22-23). For a given wage (as a share of national income, expressed in terms of the 
standard commodity) we can derive the share of profits as a residual. There thus emerges a 
conflict of interests between the working and capitalist class in the economy as a whole. 
Although some have recommended Sraffa as a basis for developing Marxian economics 
(Steedman, 1977), its asocial nature is notable, and income is the sole basis on which to define 
classes. This work was developed further by Roemer (1980, 1981), who sought to generalise 
the result to one which permitted continuous substitution of factors of production. In particular, 
he developed a “Marxian” general equilibrium analysis of exploitation in a stylised capitalist 
economy (and in other types of economy too). Subsequently, this was extended to include a 
theory of endogenous class formation, based on initial endowments of capital, permitting 
decomposition in capitalism into five classes, who vary according to whether they utilise their 
own capital, and buy or sell labour power (Roemer 1982, 1988). The “pure capitalist” hires 
labour power; a “small capitalist” hires labour power but also works themselves using their 
own capital; the “petty bourgeois artisan” is purely self-employed; the “semiproletarian” is 
partly self-employed, but also sells labour power on the labour market; the “proletarian” is fully 
committed to the labour market, selling his or her labour power. Finally, Roemer (1994) 
formulated an alternative future for socialism based on initial endowments and incentives 
within a general equilibrium framework. Roemer’s work continues to attract attention from a 
variety of scholars (Veneziani, 2013; Skillman, 2015). However, overall, the approaches of 
Sraffa, Steedman and Roemer provide mathematically robust treatments which do not rely on 
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marginal productivity theory. However, they all treat economic interactions in a way in which 
other aspects of class (social and cultural) are ignored, and so the critique of the mainstream 
by Fine and Milonakis (2009) — that the economy is reduced to market interactions alone — 
can equally be applied to the approaches of Sraffa, Steedman and Roemer (criticism 2B). 
 
In examining the relationship between individual and class in institutional economics, Fine and 
Milionakis (2009) turn to Veblen, arguing: ‘Crucial in Veblen’s theory of institutional change 
and in his formulation of Darwinian cumulative causation is the concept of “habits of thought”’ 
(p.164). These are induced in human beings by their material circumstances, be it ‘hereditary 
bent, occupation, tradition, education, climate, food supply’ or what have you (Veblen, 1907, 
p. 438; cited in Fine and Milonakis, 2009, p.164). Veblen (1990, p. 239) defines institutions 
as, ‘settled habits of thought common to the generality of man’. As noted by Fine and 
Milonakis, such habits can be contrasted with the optimising, rational agent in marginalist 
economics, and class consciousness in Marxian political economy. In so doing, Veblen was 
able to identify the mechanism through which institutions affect preferences and tastes, thus 
connecting the institutional structure of society and human conduct (Hodgson, 2001, p.150; 
Fine and Milonakis, 2009, p.164). Other aspects of Veblen’s thought are of interest too, for 
example the notion of conspicuous consumption, where individuals adopt consumption 
patterns which emulate those of their peers. This leads Fine and Milonakis to conclude that, in 
Veblen’s analysis, private ownership and ‘pecuniary emulation’ (p.166) become ‘the material 
and psychological foundations of the leisure class’ (Bowman, 1998, p. xix). 
 
Lenin’s approach, discussed above, should also be considered in relation to sociology and 
economics. Ownership of means of production is an important factor in his definition. Indeed, 
it is not the ex post distribution of income, but the a priori sphere of production that determines 
class. Additionally, although ownership of the means of production may be considered an 
economic factor (albeit with historical, political, social and economic drivers), the third 
criterion that Lenin put forward focusses on power relations as an element of class. An 
individual’s role in the social organisation of labour is not something that can be reduced to 
economics forces alone, and complex sociological power relations, both within the workplace 
and the complex Russian socio-political superstructure, occupied Lenin’s attention. His fourth 
criteria for defining a class (iv above) — the type and quantity of socially produced wealth that 
the classes can access — is an economic criteria, which resonates with the initial endowments 
15 | P a g e  
 
 
of mainstream economics, or Roemer’s general equilibrium theory. However, this is only part 
of a general approach that includes economic and social aspects (thus it is congruent with our 
framework proposed in Table 1). Lenin also considers the position of women, arguing that even 
after the 1917 Russian Revolution women remained “house slaves”. He suggested work was 
needed in creating a state apparatus to ensure women were emancipated and sex inequality 
eliminated (1919, pp.23-24). Overall, Lenin’s development of Marx and Engel’s class analysis 
considers the economic base and mode of production. However, as Lenin’s framework 
acknowledges, capitalism is an evolving socio-political system with intra-class groupings 
characterised by people’s role in the social organisation of labour. This was conceived in class-
terms, but also in terms of inequality by gender. 
 
Concerning sociology, Weber adopts a form of economic reductionism (2B). Class and status 
consist of the two dimensions which form the social structure. However, regarding class, 
Weber takes a narrow view: ‘Class situation is ultimately market situation’ (1946, p.182). In 
other words, this dichotomy (class-status) enables class to be reduced only to the economic, 
specifically to the market. Moreover, as noted by Sorensen, Weber’s class does not incorporate 
a structural theory of inequality and Weber ‘assumes standard economic theory of how people 
obtain unequal returns on their assets and resources’ (p.4). Under conditions of perfect 
competition, and in the absence of transactions costs, ‘there are no permanent advantages, or 
above the market returns, to be obtained at the expense of somebody else, thus class location 
is irrelevant’ (Sorenson, 1985, p.4). It is noteworthy that Weber has argued that economic 
behaviour is influenced by social institutions in different realms, but there is a tendency, in his 
treatment of class, to adopt a form of reductionism not dissimilar to that of the marginalists. 
 
Poulantzas (1975) expands Marx’s analysis on the role of state and bureaucracy in advanced 
capitalism, offering a nuanced discussion of “class positions”. Classes are categories within 
modes of production, which only exist within a given society. Poulantzas observes overlapping 
modes of production — or “social formations” — in individual societies, departing from the 
simple bourgeoisie-proletariat schema. Poulantzas (1975) distinguished classes by ideology 
and political stance, as well as economic circumstances. Linked to the concept of the labour 
aristocracy, Poulantzas discusses the “new petty bourgeoisie” (managers, technical personnel, 
etc.), who share many of the economic features of the proletarian class position, but cannot be 
considered typical proletarians due to their ideology and political views. This analysis was set 
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within the productive-unproductive labour framework, with Poulantzas observing: ‘every 
worker is a wage-earner, every wage-earner is certainly not a worker, for not every wage-earner 
is engaged in productive labor’ (1975, p.20). With the removal of this materialistic basis, the 
notion of class becomes blurred. However, by endeavouring to avoid the economic 
reductionism frequently associated with the Marxist tradition, Poulantzas relegates the 
economic base in terms of its importance for class analysis. Additionally, Poulantzas seems to 
conduct a task of analysing class in this new perceptive, almost in parallel with Bourdieu. 
 
Bourdieu (1984, p. xii), in his ‘endeavour to rethink Max Weber’s opposition between class 
and stand’, suggests a causal connection between class location and habitus. However, in his 
work there is no suggestion as to which one of these two categories is primary. For Bourdieu, 
the occupational division of labour, which comprises a system, is an essential element of the 
class structure. An individual’s position in this division of labour is a manifestation of their 
capital, which is ‘the set of actually usable resources and powers’ which they possess (1984, 
p.114). In this context Bourdieu explains that there are different types of capital which are 
explanatory in this process, including economic capital and, crucially, cultural capital. 
Economic capital encompasses traditional wealth, including income, savings and ownership, 
each reflecting the key aspects of class in an economic sense. Cultural capital, in contrast, 
captures an individuals’ cultural preferences reflecting more than a personal preference: it is a 
marker of social status.  
 
In contrast to Ricardo (1951 [1821]), Sraffa (1960) and Roemer (1980, 1981, 1982, 1988, 
1994), who adopted a deductive approach to class, Bourdieu (1984, 1991) began by looking at 
data and constructing his categories on the basis of observation (i.e. an inductive approach). 
Using survey data Bourdieu sought to analyse individuals within their occupational position 
according to three criteria: (i) the volume of capital agents possess; (ii) the composition vis-à-
vis economic and cultural capital; and, (iii) the individual’s trajectory (relative to their family 
of origin). The cultural is a competence which can be drawn upon in a particular social setting 
and stems primarily from education and family. Using this framework Bourdieu identifies the 
social space, and the three axes that comprise it — volume, composition and trajectory — are 
continuous. 
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Recent applications of Bourdieu’s principles have captured the attention of academics, as well 
as having broader impact through media (e.g. Savage et al, 2013, Savage 2015; see also Wright 
2005a, p.1). In developing their new social class typology, Savage et al argue we ‘need to move 
away from a focus on class boundaries at the middle reaches of the class structure towards an 
analysis of the power of elite formation’ (2016, p.1011). Savage et al (2013) established an 
individual’s class position through a survey that included questions on three types of capital; 
economic, social and cultural.3 An individual’s economic capital is measured by household 
income, household savings and house value, combined into an assets-variable. Ambiguities 
emerge in that an individual may be relatively poor, where household income is high (a point 
acknowledged by Savage et al 2013). The three capitals form six standardized variables (e.g. 
mean status scores of contacts, total number of contacts, highbrow cultural capital, emerging 
cultural capital, income and assets) and the result is seven classes: elite; established middle 
class; technical middle class; new affluent workers; traditional working class; emergent service 
workers; and, the precariat. This work, particularly, received significant interest in the UK 
media, and from the public. 
 
One criticism of Bourdieu’s original work has been regarding his treatment of gender as 
another aspect of domination. Bourdieu’s work developed in this regard. Initially, he regarded 
social space as the primary factor in shaping habitus, and demographic characteristics (gender, 
ethnicity, age) were secondary. Indeed, as women move up the social hierarchy, he suggested, 
the differences between the sexes tended to weaken (see Bourdieu 1984, p.382). As Weininger 
notes: ‘The habitus is always “gendered”; however, the consequences of this (with respect to 
the practices it produces) vary according to position in social space’ (2005, p.137). In later 
work Bourdieu discarded the view that gender was of secondary importance to location in 
social space concerning habitus. Indeed, as noted by Weininer (2005, p.139), Bourdieu pointed 
to the ‘dramatic continuity of gender structures across historical time’.  
 
                                                          
3 The economic questions include questions on household income, ownership of capital and savings. The questions 
on social capital investigates a person’s social network, analysing the interrelations between occupation groups. 
The cultural questions focus on the individual’s leisure activities, differencing between high culture and popular 
culture. This provides an overview of the modern connections between occupation, geographical characteristics, 
educational profile and class. The analysis of social capital analyses the individual’s social ties, where occupations 
with higher social status have higher scores, and occupations with lower status have lower scores. The social 
capital of a person is measured by the mean of their social network score. As mentioned previously, cultural 
capital distinguishes between high-culture and popular-culture. The measurement of this variable is complex as 
modern society’s elite increasingly partake in popular-culture (e.g. attending football matches). 
18 | P a g e  
 
 
Fine (2000) has also criticised the way Bourdieu defines and treats social capital. He identifies 
a combination of reductionisms with ‘heavy abstractions’ in Bourdieu’s work. For example, 
economic capital is reduced to resources, and this resembles the reductionism that Sraffians 
and mainstream economists undertake in focussing on income. Also, capital is attached to 
power (power reduced to capital and vice versa), as Bourdieu (1984, p.114) regards capital as 
‘the set of actually usable resources and powers’. Additionally, the social is dichotomised from 
the economic, as individuals can have different compositions of economic and social capital 
without considering their co-determination. In other words, despite the ‘connection between 
class and habitus’, Bourdieu’s methodology abstracts the one category from the other. 
 
Contributing to the debate on classes from an analytical Marxist perspective, Wright (1985, 
1994, 2005b) explores the criteria that define class. He notes that much of Marx’s work is 
concerned with ‘abstract structural maps of class relations, and the analysis of concrete 
conjunctural maps of classes-as-actors’ (1985, p.6). The former considers established class 
structures as polarised, for example between bourgeoisie and proletariat. In contrast, the 
concrete conjunctural political analyses are more nuanced, reflecting the historical specificity 
of particular political struggles. In interpreting Wright’s observation we might think of this as 
a tension between a deductive “class structure” analysis, and an inductive examination of 
groups within classes, such as professional and managerial workers. At a conceptual level, we 
can also draw distinction between class structure as reflecting relationships between classes, 
whereas class formation is defined by relations within classes (p.10). 
 
Wright’s contribution was particularly interested in developing a treatment that addresses the 
“embarrassment of the middle classes” (1985, p.13), which had been at the heart of critiques 
of Marxian class analysis (recent examinations of the middle class in the Marxian tradition 
include Ikeler and Limonic, 2018). He re-specifies the notion of exploitation in a way that 
permits the conceptual integration of the middle class into his analysis. Building on Roemer’s 
(1982) notion of exploitation based on differential skills, he sees credentials (e.g. professional 
qualifications) as a mechanism for an exploitative transfer. These skills may be possessed by 
expert managers, expert supervisors or non-managerial experts. Based on the analysis above, 
this resonates with Lenin’s (1919) categorisation of classes including “status” in a historically-
determined system of production (point i).  
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Another hallmark of Wright’s analysis was his analysis of data, in particular focussing on 
different categories of wage-earners. He found little support for Poulantzas’s (1975) use of 
productive labour as the criteria for separating the working class from other wage-earners and, 
based on US survey data, he argued that the empirical support suggests the working class 
should be categorised as ‘uncredentialled non-managerial employees’ (Wright, 1985, p.182). 
Likewise, he rejected a manual-service worker distinction for defining the working class. 
Another example of Wright’s empirical work is in his comparison of the US and Sweden where 
he looks at the role of credentials. He finds the annual incomes of expert managers relative to 
proletarians is quite similar between the two countries, and average income among wage 
earners increases monotonically as you move along each of the dimensions of exploitation. It 
is also important to note that other themes and considerations in these empirical analyses 
included the role of family, gender and ethnicity. 
 
In summary, it is apparent that approaches such as those of the marginalists, Sraffa and Weber, 
focus excessively on class as an economic category. We argue that social and cultural factors 
cannot be analysed independently of the economic. Moreover, class is complex and interacts 
with other forms of social domination, for example by gender or ethnicity. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
As a consequence of the Global Financial Crisis many individuals have experienced stagnant, 
or falling wages (in countries such as the UK and Greece). The effects have been felt, and 
continue to be, most keenly by workers. At the same time, the gender pay gap has persisted, 
and racial discrimination polarises society. We have focussed on one aspect of domination, 
namely class, and examined a plurality of perspectives from the political economy, sociology 
and economics literatures. We have focussed on the traditions developed by leading thinkers, 
to structure our comparison. A key position, which we have argued, is that class analysis is of 
enduring relevance, but the connections between the individual within a class, and mechanisms 
through which a class acts, need to be developed. 
 
Our article has argued that class (comprising economic, social and cultural aspects) is a 
fundamental building block in the analysis of capitalism, and economic systems more 
generally. This is manifest in ongoing inequality and social tensions over issues such as 
business interests and state control, trade and migration, austerity and wage stagnation, and the 
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political landscape of Western democracies. We demonstrated that the classical political 
economists saw class as a key object of study, somewhat reflecting on its political and social 
dimensions. Nevertheless, Ricardo in particular viewed class primarily as an economic 
concept, and classical approaches in the heterodox tradition — such as Sraffian economics — 
continue to structure their theory in this way. Mainstream economics, too, is reductionist. It is 
reductionist in the double-sense that it “reduces” social scientific explanations to accounts that 
only involve economic phenomena and process (economic reductionism); further, it employs 
a micro-reductionist framework in which social outcomes are analysed in terms of individual 
actions and interactions. Plainly, both are inadequate. 
 
Marxian political economy emphasises social and political, alongside economic forces. This is 
framed in the long-run model of historical materialism, with the mode of production being a 
key concept. The economic base reflects the stage of development of the productive forces and 
production relations and the “superstructure” reflects the political, social and cultural aspects 
of society, which support the base. Class conflict is thus an essential element in the progress of 
society. There are other axes of domination in human history, and exclusive focus on class can 
distract from other axes of power, such as by gender and ethnicity. Engels discussed gender 
and the role of the family at some length, and “divide and conquer” strategies have been a 
hallmark of the Marxist literature. However, it is important to avoid “bolting on” other 
emancipatory projects, and a current, intersectional analysis of power and domination, is 
needed to properly reflect the contradictions of contemporary capitalism. Feminist scholars, in 
particular, highlight the importance of intersectionality in class analysis, addressing the 
experience of capitalism and patriarchy as a double penalty to women (Beloso, 2012; Swank 
and Fahs, 2013). This penalty is, of course, increased when accounting for racism, ageism and 
related discrimination (Kim, 2009). Moreover, feminist sociologists have provided valuable 
insights into societies in developing countries, stressing the link between institutions, class and 
gender (e.g. Velaskar, 2016, p.408). The Marxian framework thus needs to evolve, albeit 
retaining the essential deductive framework, including mode of production, economic base, 
superstructure and capitalist exploitation as principal objects of investigation. Concerning 
mainstream economics, if it to be a genuine social science, it needs to enhance the explanatory 
role of social and cultural processes (including those related to class), embrace 
interdisciplinarity, and leave its economic reductionism (and “imperialism”) behind. 
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In looking at how heterodox and mainstream analyses of class can be strengthened, we have 
suggested that sociology — in particular, the class analyses of Bourdieu and Wright — have a 
contribution to make. Wright’s focus on deductive structure, layered with an empirical analysis 
of the composition and classification of wage earners, is a useful framework that can be 
juxtaposed with individualist models of wage inequality (as perpetuated by mainstream labour 
economists). The inductive focus on individual characteristics (from Bourdieu) would resonate 
somewhat with the contemporary multivariate approaches employed by mainstream applied 
economists. More generally, the analysis of cultural capital and habitus could add a layer 
presently missing in economic reductionist treatments. This does not imply economic, social 
and cultural capital are equally important. It is our view that the main inequalities in capitalism 
are economic. But, a more complete analysis of capitalism requires consideration be given to 
the superstructure, and cultural aspects of contemporary society.  
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